Während viele kompetente Journalisten der westlichen Presse den unweigerlichen Untergang Afghanistans geradezu lustvoll herbeizureden versuchen, sehen das dummerweise gerade die Afghanen etwas anders... muss wohl an der mangelnden Bildung liegen?
The un-happening of a civil warhttp://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/06/19/the_un_happening_of_a_civil_warAs coalition troops prepare to leave Afghanistan next December, reports of an impending civil war, sensationalized and embellished by foreign press mostly, have dominated many international headlines. (...) But if you ask ordinary Afghans about their future in 2015 and beyond, they are more likely to express fears about an economic recession, increased violence by militants, total abandonment by the international community, and uncertainty about President Karzai's replacement than a civil war or a triumphant return of the Taliban to power.
Die Afghanen erkennen den Unterschied zwischen 1992 und 2014:
This discrepancy is because the political dynamics in today's Afghanistan are radically different from those in 1992, when various armed factions of anti-Soviet rebels took power. (...) Afghans take these factors into account when they calculate their future. Uncertainty and economic fears may be well founded and prevalent, but no one in Afghanistan believes the takeover of a half-finished construction site by a bunch of violent extremists
Seit Jahren gewinnen die Afghanen Vertrauen in ihre Armee, während die Taliban (insbesondere durch ihre IED-Strategie, welche massive zivile Verluste verursacht, auf die sie jedoch ausweichen mussten, da direkte Gefechte ihnen zu schwere Verluste zufügten) die Unterstützung der Bevölkerung verspielt haben:
While some foreign analysts appear to have concluded a post-withdrawal Taliban takeover is inevitable, public opinion surveys inside Afghanistan show that Afghans beg to differ en masse. For example, a 2012 public opinion survey by the Asia Foundation found that Afghans' confidence in their security forces and in their future has steadily risen over the last six years. In fact, the foundation found that this confidence, especially in the ANA, runs in the 90th percentile (93 percent of Afghans expressed a "fair amount" or a "great deal" confidence in ANA). Meanwhile, sympathy for insurgents has declined steadily, especially in the last few years as the Taliban and other militant groups have stepped up their violent terror campaign, primarily attacking and killing civilians in the country.
Ohne Unterstützung der Bevölkerung können Insurgenten nicht gewinnen... man lese Mao, man lese Guevara, man lese wen auch immer. Die einzige Schlacht, die die Taliban noch gewinnen, ist die Schlagzeilenschlacht in den Medien - und auch hier nur in den westlichen Medien.
The Taliban and other insurgent groups have also failed to make their usual talking points gain attention in the local media. This is primarily because their vision of a post-2014 Afghanistan is radically different from what the majority of the public wants to see. (...) But the Taliban have learned that staging spectacular attacks on Kabul and other major cities in Afghanistan gives them plenty of international media coverage instead. Such attacks achieve little in terms of military significance, but they confirm the narrative that the Taliban are "at the gates of Kabul."
Fazit: es hat einen guten Grund, dass die Taliban zu Verhandlungen bereit sind. Der Grund ist, dass es für sie keinen militärischen Sieg geben wird.
