@Bumblebee
Besten Dank für die sehr verständliche Erklärung.
In der Tat "Stall ist auf der anderen Seite aber richtig doof"
In meiner Frage war der Hintergrund aus 1989 - Quantas 747 beschrieben/ Der Pilot musste den "Stall" den defekter Autopilot verursachte - mit händischem Sturzflug verhindern. Quantas lies Piloten in Un-Kenntnis des fehlerhaften Autopiloten 6 Monate lang.
Hier nun Berichte zu Boeing: https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/5766398-ASRS-Reports-for-737-max8.html#document/p10/a486269
Pilot beschreibt das als "criminally"
- Ist das Luftfahrt nun by try by error im Linienflugbetrieb? The MCAS function becomes active when the airplane Angle of Attack exceeds a
threshold based on airspeed and altitude. Stabilizer incremental commands are
limited to 2.5 degrees and are provided at a rate of 0.27 degrees per second. The
magnitude of the stabilizer input is lower at high Mach number and greater at low
Mach numbers. The function is reset once angle of attack falls below the Angle of
Attack threshold or if manual stabilizer commands are provided by the flight crew.
If the original elevated AOA condition persists, the MCAS function commands
another incremental stabilizer nose down command according to current aircraft
Mach number at actuation. This description is not currently in the 737 Flight Manual Part 2, nor the Boeing FCOM, though it will be added to them soon. This communication highlights that an
entire system is not described in our Flight Manual. This system is now the subject
of an AD. I think it is unconscionable that a manufacturer, the FAA, and the airlines would
have pilots flying an airplane without adequately training, or even providing
available resources and sufficient documentation to understand the highly complex
systems that differentiate this aircraft from prior models. The fact that this airplane
requires such jury rigging to fly is a red flag. Now we know the systems employed
are error prone--even if the pilots aren't sure what those systems are, what
redundancies are in place, and failure modes.
I am left to wonder: what else don't I know? The Flight Manual is inadequate and
almost criminally insufficient. All airlines that operate the MAX must insist that
Boeing incorporate ALL systems in their manuals.
Synopsis
B737MAX Captain expressed concern that some systems such as the MCAS are not
fully described in the aircraft Flight Manual.[/center]